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ABSTRACT. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Murman coast trade and the Northern Dvina trade were two clearly
distinct branches of Western European commerce. The Murman coast trade involved the commerce with the regional economy
of the Kola Peninsula, and the Northern Dvina trade coincided with the transit trade with the Russian interior.
In the 1550s, the English established commercial relations with interior Russia via the mouth of the Northern Dvina, mainly
exchanging woollen cloth and metals for north and central Russian forestry and agriculture products. In the 1570s, the Dutch
followed suit, and by the second decade of the seventeenth century, they had squeezed the English almost completely out of the
Russian market. The Northern Dvina trade became a major line of Dutch business, involving the transit trade with interior Russia,
the exchange of the products of the north and central Russian forestry and agriculture for gold and silver money and a wide range
of military stores and luxury goods. In the 1560s, the Dutch developed commercial relations with the Murman coast, exchanging
locally produced exports like cod, salmon, furs and train oil for locally used imports like woollen cloth, tinware, salt, pepper, and
wine. In addition, from the early 1570s, the Dutch used Kola as an alternative to the Northern Dvina mouth as a port for the transit
trade with interior Russia; but they did so only until about 1585, when the tsar directed all foreign trade of interior Russia to proceed
via the newly founded port of Archangel on the Northern Dvina. After that, Kola only remained an international commercial port
for the local economy of the Murman coast. The Dutch continued to trade with the Murman coast on a very small scale throughout
the seventeenth century, but Archangel was by far their main commercial destination in the Barents Sea area.
Key words: Northern Dvina, Archangel, Murman coast, Kola, Russian trade, Dutch trade, English trade, commercial relations
RÉSUMÉ. Au XVIe et XVIIe siècle, les échanges de la côte Mourmane et ceux de la Dvina septentrionale représentaient deux
branches distinctes du commerce européen occidental. Les échanges de la côte Mourmane faisaient intervenir le commerce avec
l’économie régionale de la presqu’île de Kola, et ceux de la Dvina septentrionale coïncidaient avec le commerce de transit avec
l’intérieur de la Russie.
Dans les années 1550, les Anglais établirent des relations commerciales avec l’intérieur de la Russie via l’embouchure de la
Dvina septentrionale, troquant surtout étoffes de laine et métaux contre des produits forestiers et agricoles du nord et du centre de
la Russie. Durant les années 1570, les Hollandais firent de même, et, vers 1620, ils avaient presque complètement évincé les Anglais
du marché russe. Les échanges de la Dvina septentrionale devinrent un important volet du monde des affaires hollandais, mettant
en jeu le commerce de transit avec l’intérieur de la Russie, le troc des produits forestiers et agricoles du nord et du centre de la Russie
contre de la monnaie en or et en argent, ainsi qu’une vaste gamme de fournitures militaires et d’articles de luxe. Dans les années
1560, les Hollandais établirent des relations commerciales avec la côte Mourmane, troquant des produits d’exportation locaux
comme la morue, le saumon, les fourrures et l’huile de poisson contre des importations destinées à un usage local comme des étoffes
de laine, de la ferblanterie, du sel, du poivre et du vin. En outre, dès le début des années 1570, les Hollandais se servirent de Kola
comme alternative à l’embouchure de la Dvina en tant que port pour le commerce de transit avec l’intérieur de la Russie; mais cela
ne dura que jusque vers 1585, lorsque le tsar décida que tout le commerce extérieur de l’intérieur de la Russie devait passer par
le port d’Arkhangelsk que l’on venait de créer sur la Dvina septentrionale. Après quoi, Kola ne resta un port de commerce
international que pour la côte Mourmane. Les Hollandais continuèrent de commercer avec la côte Mourmane à très petite échelle
durant tout le XVIIe siècle, mais Arkhangelsk fut de loin leur plus importante destination commerciale dans la région de la mer de
Barents.
Mots clés: Dvina septentrionale, Arkhangelsk, côte Mourmane, Kola, commerce russe, commerce hollandais, commerce anglais,
relations commerciales
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INTRODUCTION
In the sixteenth century, the Southern Netherlands city of
Antwerp was the central entrepôt, the store-house and distri-
bution centre of high-value products for Europe and the
world. During their war of independence, the Dutch lost
Antwerp to Spain in 1585. After that, they blockaded the port
and brought its flourishing sea commerce to a stop. In the
decades around 1600, the commercial point of gravity shifted
north to the Dutch Republic, which rose to primacy as the
dominant shipping and trading nation of Europe and the
world. The province of Holland, especially the city of Am-
sterdam, developed into the main international emporium on
a considerably larger scale than Antwerp had been. During
the seventeenth century, Dutch entrepreneurs dominated the
multilateral, international exchange of commodities. Their
business was international commerce, consisting essentially
of buying and selling on foreign markets, and importing,
processing and re-exporting commodities (Jeannin, 1982;
Klein, 1982; Klein and Veluwenkamp, 1993).
England ranked second as a shipping and trading nation
(Murphy, 1973). Its commerce was, in essence, based on the
bilateral exchange of commodities. In contrast to the Dutch
Republic, England re-exported its imports only on a rela-
tively small scale. This meant that the supply which the
merchants of England offered their foreign counterparts was
largely limited to English products, mainly woollen cloth.
And it meant that the demand of the English for foreign
commodities was more or less limited to what was needed
for their home market. This rendered the English merch-
ants in the international marketplace rather vulnerable to
competition from the Dutch. The Dutch, having a much wider
range of commodities in supply and demand, outbid them on
many markets.
It was, thus, with a very different commercial momentum
that entrepreneurs from England and the Dutch Republic in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries went out to look for
new trade routes, new markets and new sources of raw
materials. The English were mainly after new markets for
their woollen cloth, and a new and safe trade route to the East
Indies (Murphy, 1973). The Dutch simply went everywhere
they could make a profit in international commerce. One of
the new areas the two competing nations opened up was the
Northern Sea, subsequently known as the Murman Sea, and
finally, much later, as the Barents Sea. The English appear to
have arrived there first, in 1553. Thereafter, Western Euro-
pean trade with the Barents Sea littoral and the Russian
interior via the North Cape sea route developed rapidly.
Studies devoted to the English and Dutch trade with
northern Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
add up to quite an extensive historiography. Many of them
discuss one or more aspects or episodes of the subject in
considerable detail, and the general story of this line of
international commerce is quite well known. Analytically,
nevertheless, the picture is not completely clear. Particularly
blurry is the connection between the development of the
Northern Dvina delta and the Murman coast—that is, the
northern coast of the Kola Peninsula—as commercial desti-
nations. It is obvious that these were the two main places
where northern Russia’s foreign trade concentrated, but it is
less than obvious to what extent they differed or matched
functionally. Ahvenainen (1967), for example, hardly dis-
criminates between the two regions, treating them as inter-
changeable or even undivided destinations. Hart (1973, 1976)
does discriminate, but his analysis remains very close to the
Amsterdam notarial acts he uses as source material, and he
omits almost entirely the historical context of his findings.
Gromyko (1960) only discusses one, albeit very important,
source for the history of the Murman coast trade in transit
commodities—the Trade Book, Torgovaja Kniga. A major
theme in the historiography is the competition between the
English and the Dutch in the Russia trade. Wijnroks (1990)
reviews this theme and stresses the role of valuable commodi-
ties as a factor in the competitive strength of the Netherlands.
In addition, he calls attention to the large degree of continuity
in commercial relations between Antwerp and the Baltic port
of Narva, and between Amsterdam and northern Russia;
merchants of Antwerp switched their Russian traffic from
Narva to the northern Russian ports in the 1570s, and moved
their operations from Antwerp to Amsterdam around 1590
(Wijnroks, 1990, 1993). Wijnroks discusses the Murman
coast as a short-lived alternative to Narva and the Northern
Dvina as a trading area for the Russian interior, sprung up
from the international trade of the local economy. But further
comparison of the commercial functions of the Murman coast
and the Northern Dvina is beyond the subject of his study.
Schade (1992) covers the commercial relations between
Russia and the Netherlands from the fifteenth century to the
beginning of the seventeenth century with clear insight. But
he does not differentiate between the commercial functions
of the two areas either, treating the Murman coast commerce
as a stage in the development of the Russian foreign trade,
which resulted in the upsurge of the Northern Dvina trade.
In this article, I aim to contribute to the insight into the
structure of Western European trade with northern Russia in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by explicitly compar-
ing the functions of the Murman coast and the Northern Dvina
delta as commercial destinations of the Dutch and the English
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Fig. 1). The
central questions concern the economies that the ports of
these areas served and the commodities which were traded
there. To what extent, in these respects, were the two destina-
tions distinct, and to what extent were they interconnected?
THE TRADITIONAL TRADE OF THE
BARENTS SEA LITTORAL
Before the English and Dutch arrived in the Barents Sea in
the 1550s and 1560s, the area had by no means been untouched
by human presence. Sami herdsmen, hunters and fishermen
had been roaming the plains and valleys of Finnmark and the
Kola Peninsula since ancient times (Osherenko and Young,
1989). Since the thirteenth or fourteenth century, Norwegian
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FIG. 1. Arena of the Barents Sea area trade (drawing by H.J. Waterbolk).
fishermen and tradesmen had lived on the Finnmark coast. In
the second quarter of the sixteenth century, Russian fisher-
men from the shores of the White Sea began to travel to the
Murman coast to catch cod during the spring season, and from
the middle of the sixteenth century, the fishery in this area
developed intensively (Ushakov and Dashcinskij, 1983;
Nielssen, 1984, 1986; Schrader, 1988).
Until the arrival of the Western Europeans, the commerce
of the Barents Sea area had only regional dimensions. The
Norwegian fishermen and traders represented the closest the
area had come to trade links with Western Europe. Their
arrival and settlement on the Finnmark coast seem to have
been brought about by the commerce with the Finnmark
littoral which had been conducted from the Hanseatic town of
Bergen since the twelfth century. The fishermen depended
heavily on their trade with Bergen, and they mainly ex-
changed dried cod for grain products. Within this Dano-
Norwegian trade system, as Hansen has labelled it, the
exchange of fish for ground grain with Bergen, and some-
times with Trondheim, remained the dominating trade of the
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FIG. 2. Trade systems of northern Fenno-Scandinavia A.D. 1550 – 1600 (Adapted from Hansen, 1984:53; drawing by H.J. Waterbolk).
coastal area extending west of the Varanger Fjord until at
least the first half of the eighteenth century (Fig. 2) (Hansen,
1984; Nielssen, 1984, 1986).
The Russian fishermen were attracted to the Murman coast
by the dense concentrations of cod and other species that
arrived there every spring. They were part of the Russian
trade system, which soon after their arrival began to overlap
with the Dano-Norwegian system in the Varanger Fjord area
as Norwegian merchants established commercial contacts
with the Murman coast (Ushakov and Dashcinskij, 1983;
Hansen, 1984; Schrader, 1988). In the first half of the six-
teenth century, this trade remained only local in nature. By
1557, Sami, Karelians, Russians and Norwegians were trad-
ing at Kegor, on poluostrov Rybachiy, the “Fisherman’s
Peninsula,” situated between Varanger Fjord and the Kola
Gulf (Gromyko, 1960; Hakluyt, 1967; Florja, 1973). The
monks from the monastery of Pechenga, or Petsamo, located
in Munckefjord, between Varanger Fjord and the Fisher-
man’s Peninsula, also became actively involved in the trade.
The monastery, consecrated in 1532, had developed a fishing
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and hunting business. In the early 1560s, its monks used to
come to Vardø to sell fish, train oil and “Wildwahren” (von
Salingen, 1914:212; Gromyko, 1960; Ahvenainen, 1967).
“Wildwahren” may probably be understood as furs (l’Honoré
Naber, 1914). From Vardø, these commodities were shipped
to Bergen (von Salingen, 1914). In the second half of the
sixteenth century and during the seventeenth century, Nor-
wegian ships called at the ports of Kola, Kholmogory (on the
lower Northern Dvina) and Sumskiy Posad (on the Karelian
shore of the White Sea). From there, they brought cargoes of
Russian grain, tar, cordage and fishery products back to
Norway (Schrader, 1988).
The economy of the Sami was linked up with the Dano-
Norwegian and the Russian trade systems. The Sami, never-
theless, were less dependent on the external trade than the
Norwegian—and probably the Russian—fishermen, as they
produced more essential products themselves (Nielssen, 1984,
1986). The Sami of Finnmark probably began to sell dried
fish in the Norwegian fishing villages in the second half of the
Middle Ages. In return, they obtained grain, iron, salt, wool-
len cloth and other useful products. In the second half of the
sixteenth century, the coastal Sami took part in the seasonal
commercial fisheries, and by the end of the seventeenth
century they were regular customers of the Norwegian trades-
men (Nielssen, 1986). The Sami of the Kola Peninsula carried
on seasonal trade in the trading places on the Murman coast,
the Fisherman’s Peninsula and Kildin Island, just east of the
Kola Gulf. The commodities exchanged were similar to those
in the Dano-Norwegian trade system; the Sami traded stockfish
for foodstuffs and utensils (Hansen, 1984).
The economy of the Sami was also linked to a third
commercial system, the Swedish trade system, which ex-
tended as far north as Varanger (Hansen, 1984). As early as
the sixteenth century, the Sami paid the Swedish crown taxes
in the form of furs. The Sami hunters thus contributed to the
supply of the royal Stockholm fur market, which met the
European demand to a considerable degree up to about the
1570s (Ahvenainen, 1967).
ENGLISH AND DUTCH TRADE WITH THE
NORTHERN DVINA DELTA
English Beginning
The opening of the West European trade with Russia via
the Northern Dvina delta occurred as a side effect of the
English search for a northeast passage to Asia. This search
was induced by the British desire to share in the lucrative
trade in Asian commodities, especially spices, which the
Portuguese dominated in the sixteenth century. In the middle
of that century, England did not have the military power to
undermine the Portuguese position, but in circles of geogra-
phers and navigators the idea was growing that a sea passage
to Cathay could be found by way of the northeast, over the top
of Europe. An important stimulus for actually sending an
expedition was the stagnation and decline in demand for
English woollen cloth on the European market after 1550.
Traditionally, woollen cloth was by far the most important
export of England. Now that this trade had dried up,
alternative markets and trade possibilities had to be found
(Murphy, 1973).
The first English expedition to search for a northeast
passage occurred in 1553 and was led by Hugh Willoughby
(Murphy, 1973). North of Lapland the three participating
ships lost each other in storm and fog. Richard Chancellor, the
captain of one of the vessels, drifted with his ship into the
White Sea and landed at the mouth of the Northern Dvina.
From there, Chancellor travelled to Moscow where he was
received by Tsar Ivan the Terrible. Both the seaman and the
tsar realised the importance of the shipping route to Russia
around North Cape and via the White Sea. During summer the
Northern Dvina was entirely navigable and an excellent
shipping link with the interior and Moscow. Soon, the new
route to Russia was being used for commercial transport
between Western Europe and central Russia (Lubimenko,
1933; Murphy, 1973; Bushkovitch, 1980).
The route, indeed, was new, although trade with Russia
was not. For a long time, Russia had had regular commercial
relations with the West via the Baltic. The Hanseatic League
had had an office in Novgorod since the early thirteenth
century. Novgorod exported, among other things, furs from
the Northern Dvina basin. As early as the beginning of the
fifteenth century, Novgorod had contacts with the Nether-
lands, whence woollen cloth, linen, subtropical fruit, salt,
beer, wine, herring and metal-ware were brought. Many of
these commodities were sold to the Russian market. The old
routes to Western Europe crossed the territories of the Ger-
man Order, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, which separated
Russia from the Baltic. This meant that the tsar was depend-
ent on other powers for his contacts with Western Europe
(Bezemer, 1988; Wijnroks, 1990; Schade, 1992). In the
sixteenth century, the importance of these contacts grew.
Western Europe had a large technical and economic lead on
Russia, and the tsar wished to provide himself not only with
precious metals and luxuries, but with arms and technical
knowledge for waging war against the Tatars and Poland-
Lithuania. But precisely because of the Russian menace,
Sweden and Poland-Lithuania frustrated the tsar’s trade with
Western Europe where they judged it dangerous. So, the tsar
had good reason to stimulate the use of the newly discovered
White Sea route. In 1555, two years after Chancellor’s
voyage, English merchants founded the Muscovy Company,
with the aim of carrying on trade with Russia (Willan, 1948;
Schade, 1992). From the English crown, the Muscovy Com-
pany obtained a monopoly of the commerce with Russia; the
tsar granted them freedom of duty and movement within
Russia—but not the monopoly of the northern route (Hart,
1969; Murphy, 1973).
Woollen cloth was apparently the main commodity the
Muscovy Company imported into Russia. Metals (tin, copper
and lead) were another important category of commodities
the Company sold to the Russians (Lubimenko, 1933; Willan,
1948; Attman, 1973; Wijnroks, 1990). In addition, the English
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brought to Russia cotton fabrics, arms and ammunition,
paper, wine, subtropical fruit, salt, medicines, East Indian
commodities and, sometimes, precious metals (Lubimenko,
1933; Attman, 1973; Wijnroks, 1990). From Russia, they
exported train oil, furs, wax, wood for masts, flax, hemp,
cable-rope, tallow and skins (Lubimenko, 1933; Attman,
1973). This trade involved mainly an exchange of commodi-
ties with the Russian interior. To a small degree, the products
exported, such as train oil, and part of the furs and skins, were
produced in the Barents Sea area itself.
Until the end of the 1570s, the Muscovy Company did not
experience any competition in the Northern Dvina trade.
Nevertheless, the English traders did not have an easy start.
The first successful return voyage, without damage to the
ships and their cargoes, did not apparently occur until 1560.
Before 1567, the Company sent at most four ships a year, and
after that, until 1581, a maximum of ten ships annually to St.
Nicholas, its anchorage in the delta of the Northern Dvina.
The Muscovy Company never became a great success (Willan,
1948; Wijnroks, 1990; Schade, 1992).
Dutch Sequel
The lack of British success may be partly explained by the
fact that Russia conquered the Baltic port of Narva from the
German Order in 1559. Subsequently, Russia carried on its
foreign trade, in which both the English and the Dutch had a
large share, mainly via Narva. As long as this route was open,
trade via the Northern Dvina was a matter of relative indiffer-
ence to the Russian government. The definitive breakthrough
of the Northern Dvina mouth as an area of international trade
was only triggered as Sweden blockaded Narva and caused
the port’s sea traffic and trade to decline sharply in the 1570s
(Gromyko, 1960; Wijnroks, 1990; Schade, 1992). Eventu-
ally, in 1581, Russia lost Narva to Sweden; but by then, the
tsar had already set out to promote the northern traffic, and at
least part of Russia’s foreign trade and of the Dutch commer-
cial connections shifted from Narva to the North, while the
Muscovy Company sent probably more ships to St. Nicholas
after 1581 than before (Willan, 1948; Hart, 1969; Wijnroks,
1990). Dutch entrepreneurs sent ships to the delta of the
Northern Dvina for the first time in 1578 (Muller, 1874;
l’Honoré Naber, 1914; Florja, 1973). Among them was the
Antwerp merchant Jan van de Walle, who soon acquired his
own pier on the river and partial freedom from tolls, and
became a supplier of valuable fabrics to the Russian court
(Muller, 1874; Kordt, 1902; Kellenbenz, 1973; Wijnroks,
1990, 1993). The new importance of the Northern Dvina
trade made the tsar found a new seaport in 1584, on the spot
where the Dutch had begun to moor their ships, near the
monastery of the Archangel Michael situated on the right
bank of the Northern Dvina where the river opens into a delta.
Initially known as Novye Kholmogory, the new port was
soon renamed Archangel, after the monastery. Archangel
was built as, and quickly became, the sole port of trade for the
Russian interior (Jansma, 1946; Il’ina and Grachov, 1987;
Schade, 1992).
The Dutch exported much the same commodities as the
English from the Northern Dvina: train oil, furs, wax, potash,
flax, hemp, skins, tallow and caviar (Attman, 1973). From the
beginning of the 1580s, they started real competition with the
English. In 1582, about ten English and ten Dutch trading
vessels called at the Northern Dvina delta. By 1600, ten to
twenty Dutch ships went to Archangel every year, whereas
the English sent only about half as many. And by the second
decade of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had squeezed
the English almost completely out of the Russian market. By
that time, probably, the English sent three or four ships to
Archangel annually, while the Dutch sent three or four dozen
(Ahvenainen, 1967; Hart, 1969; Kellenbenz, 1973; Wijnroks,
1990, 1993).
The most important underlying cause of all this was the
divergence of the economic developments of England and the
Dutch Republic. As mentioned earlier, the English supply
and demand on foreign markets was more or less limited to
that of the English home market. The Dutch, on the other
hand, bought and sold for wider markets. Consequently, there
was virtually no limit to the nature and the volume of the
commodities they supplied and demanded. This implied that,
on many markets, the Dutch could outbid the English—
which is exactly what they did in Russia. They imported the
valuable goods that the Russian market demanded, but the
English could not supply (Wijnroks, 1990; Schade, 1992). An
important competitive edge of the Dutch over the English was
their ability to meet the Russian demand for precious metals,
especially silver. The Russian balance of trade was strongly
active. Foreign merchants had to pay the deficit in ready
money. The financially strong Amsterdam staple market was
able to absorb the negative balance of trade with Russia, and
the Dutch exported rixdollars and ducats without difficulty.
The Dutch paid the Russian tolls in silver money, and also
paid for the Russian commodities, at least partly, in ready
money. Moreover, they were able to give credit. The English
did not have to pay tolls and carried on barter trade. They were
not able to supply precious metals in sufficient quantity.
England needed all available bullion for the East India Com-
pany; English merchants were not allowed to export their
own currency in excess of that. It is clear that the financial
weakness of the English was detrimental to the competitive
power of the Muscovy Company (Hart, 1969; Bruijn, 1977;
Schade, 1992).
Archangel remained the sole seaport for interior Russia for
more than a century. Only from 1721, after the Great North-
ern War, did St. Petersburg, too, play an important role
(Busching, 1790; Knoppers, 1976; Schade, 1992). Through-
out the seventeenth century, Dutch commercial contacts with
Russia remained concentrated in Archangel. On average, at
least 35 Dutch vessels called at the northerly port annually,
and many more when war interfered with the connections
with the Baltic (Hart, 1976; Bruijn, 1979; Klompmaker,
1980). Besides silver coins and gold coins, the Russian
imports via Archangel consisted mainly of military stores and
luxury goods for the tsar and the rich nobility. These included
pearls, precious stones, luxury textiles (woollen cloth, silk,
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velvet, linen, damask, gold and silver brocade, gold and silver
lace, gold and silver thread and braid), arms, copper, brass,
pewter, lead, iron, spices, groceries, wine, sugar, paper, dyes
(indigo, brazil) and building materials (Attman 1973;
Klompmaker, 1980). Russia exported via Archangel mainly
the produce of its forests, farms, and fisheries. The exports
included train oil, masts, woad ashes, potash, tar, wax, furs,
skins, bristles, Russia leather, tallow, hemp, flax, grain and
caviar. In addition, Russia re-exported silk from Persia
(Attman, 1973; de Buck, 1988). The Archangel trade in-
volved mainly the exchange of commodities with interior
Russia. Few of the exports were produced in the Barents Sea
area itself—probably a portion of the furs, and certainly the
train oil and the sealskins. These, however, accounted for only
a fraction of the value of the total exports (Attman, 1973).
DUTCH TRADE WITH THE MURMAN COAST
The First Commercial Contacts
Probably in the early 1560s, ten years after the first arrival
of the English in the Northern Dvina delta in 1553, the Dutch
opened another sphere of northern commerce by establishing
trade connections with the local economy of the Murman area
and its northern Russian hinterland. Since the Middle Ages,
they had visited the coasts of Norway to buy fish and whale
oil, and they had visited northern Norway even before 1553.
Their presence in northern Norway was probably connected
with the Hanseatic trade of Bergen (Ahvenainen, 1967;
Schade, 1992).
According to a widespread historiographical tradition,
Dutchmen had participated in the trade on the Fisherman’s
Peninsula on the Murman coast as early as 1557 and even
before that. This tradition is based on the contemporary
account of Stephen Burrough (Hakluyt 1967; Hansen, 1984;
Wijnroks, 1990; Schade, 1992). As early as 1902, Kordt
expressed doubt about the correctness of this interpretation of
Burrough’s account. He argued that the first direct commer-
cial contact of the Dutch with the Munckefjord-Pechenga
area was made by the Dutchman Philips Winterkoning in the
first half of the 1560s, and that this contact marked the
beginning of the Dutch trade with the Murman coast (Kordt,
1902). The issue has not yet been settled. Kordt’s doubt has
been neglected, however, and his arguments have not yet
been convincingly contested (see Schade, 1992).
Winterkoning’s story remains a good one. His venture was
recorded by his contemporary Simon von Salingen, another
pioneer of the northern commerce. In the early 1560s,
Winterkoning worked for the Danish governor of Vardø. At
some stage, he left the governor’s service and went to Ant-
werp. In 1564, he sailed from Antwerp back to Vardø on a
ship of the company that he had founded with two Antwerp
merchants. However, by then Vardø had a new governor, who
accused Winterkoning of violating the trade privileges of
Bergen and Trondheim and denied him and his men further
access to Vardø. Winterkoning was forced to sail away, but
before he did so, the monks of Pechenga—who, as noted
above, carried on trade with Vardø in those years—took
advantage of the situation and suggested that he come to the
Munckefjord the next year to buy fish, salmon, train oil and
“Wildtwaren” [sic].
The following year, 1565, Winterkoning sailed to
Munckefjord, loaded his ship with fish, salmon, train oil and
“other commodities,” and sent it back to his associates. He
himself hired a Russian ship to sail to the White Sea, to St.
Nicholas, and to travel from there on to Moscow. The ship
was loaded with Winterkoning’s remaining commodities,
among which were wine and woollen cloth. On their way,
however, in an inlet of the Murman coast, Winterkoning and
his men were robbed and killed by Russian sailors (Kordt,
1902; l’Honoré Naber, 1914; von Salingen, 1914:212).
Following Winterkoning’s death, a few Dutch ships sailed
annually to the Pechenga monastery to trade with the monks,
and also with Russian traders who were attracted from distant
places like Kholmogory and Kargopol. The monastery pros-
pered. In 1565, it had about 20 monks and 30 lay hands, and
by 1572, these figures had risen to 50 and 200 respectively.
By that time the monks controlled the salmon fishery in the
inlets between the Fisherman’s Peninsula and the Varanger
Fjord (von Salingen, 1914). In about 1590, the monastery was
burnt down by the Finns, but Pechenga remained a destina-
tion for traders at least throughout the 1590s (Ahvenainen,
1967).
Before his fatal and abortive journey to Moscow,
Winterkoning had written to his associates asking them to
send additional commodities. They did, indeed, send two
more ships, which arrived in the Munckefjord in the autumn
of 1565. The monks sent one ship back to Antwerp with news
of Winterkoning’s fate, and the other to the hamlet of Kola to
winter. At that time, Kola had only three houses. The next
year, 1566, Winterkoning’s company sent its bookkeeper
Simon von Salingen with two more ships, loaded with cloth,
pepper, tinware and other commodities, to Munckefjord to
try and recover Winterkoning’s lost goods and to carry on
trade. Von Salingen loaded his two ships and the vessel that
had wintered at Kola with fish, train oil, salmon and other
commodities at Munckefjord and on the Fisherman’s Penin-
sula. No cargo was available at Kola at that stage, but in the
years that followed, Dutch trading vessels began to arrive at
Kola annually, and the hamlet began to grow as a trading
place, taking part—along with Pechenga—in the new, devel-
oping, foreign commerce of the Murman coast (von Salingen,
1914; Ahvenainen, 1967).
The Kola Boom in the 1570s
Throughout the 1560s, the foreign trade of the Murman
coast was limited mainly to the exchange of the area’s
products for commodities used locally. The Dutch bought
local products, namely dried and salted cod, train oil, blubber
and skins of marine mammals, oil of cod and shark, salmon,
furs, and mica, and perhaps, to some extent, products from the
northern Russian hinterland, such as wax, flax and leather.
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They brought commodities for local use, like salt for the
export fisheries, and probably wine, woollen cloth, pepper
and tinware (von Salingen, 1914; Gromyko, 1960;
Ahvenainen, 1967). All this changed in the 1570s, as the
Swedish blockade of Narva and the Russian policy to pro-
mote trade via the North boosted not only the trade of the
Northern Dvina but also that of the Murman coast. The Dutch
continued their traditional business with the area, but the
range of the commodities traded expanded significantly. By
1575, the exports via the Murman coast included a wide range
of produce from the Russian interior, such as tallow, skins,
flax, hemp, grain, furs, wax, tar, pitch and ash (Gromyko,
1960; Hart, 1969; Wijnroks, 1990). Its imports now included
dried fruit, spices, sugar, chemicals, medicines, metals, metal
wares, and most likely also woollen cloth, wine and precious
metals. In the course of the 1570s, Kola became the most
important port of the Murman coast (von Salingen, 1914;
Gromyko, 1960; Attman, 1973). In 1574, it had 44 home-
steads (Ushakov and Dashcinskij, 1983). It remained an
international commercial port for the economy of the Kola
Peninsula, but, in addition, it developed into a thriving centre
of commercial exchange between interior Russia and West-
ern Europe, where visiting Western European merchants and
Russian traders met and traded (Gromyko, 1960; Hansen,
1984; Wijnroks, 1990). In 1582, the first voevoda, or gover-
nor, of Kola was appointed by the tsar. He set up a trade centre
with storage accommodation for the foreign commerce,
founded a weigh-house, and started levying toll (von Salingen,
1914; Ahvenainen, 1967; Ushakov and Dashcinskij, 1983).
The commerce at Kola seems to have been conducted
during an annual fair, held at Petermas on 29 June. Among the
participating Russian traders were inhabitants of Kola itself
as well as merchants from the towns of the lower Northern
Dvina, such as Kholmogory, and from White Sea towns, such
as Suma and Kem (Hansen, 1984). Most foreign merchants
visting Kola came from the Netherlands (Ahvenainen, 1967).
Indeed, the commercial relations with the Dutch were para-
mount in the foreign trade of the Murman coast (Gromyko,
1960). The Dutch were so active that, in 1575, the English
Muscovy Company was warned it would be left out in the
cold by the Dutch and Flemings unless it soon began to take
the trade with Lapland seriously (Hacquebord, 1988). Some
English merchants who, in 1578, prepared a journey to Kola
declared in a memorandum that they planned to drive the
Dutch out of the Kola trade within two or three years. In
practice, however, the role of the English seems to have been
quite modest. Indeed, there are no records of English vessels
in Kola at all (Ahvenainen, 1967).
The Narrowing of the Murman Coast Trade Between 1585
and 1620
The Kola commercial boom was short-lived. In the second
half of the 1580s, the tsar changed his policy and decided to
direct all foreign trade with interior Russia via Archangel.
After 1585, by edict of the tsar, the Kola export was confined
to locally produced commodities (Gromyko, 1960). Kola lost
its share of interior-Russian trade and remained only a centre
of regional production and export.
The composition of the Kola export of local products
narrowed again about 1600 and shortly after. In the 1560s,
there was mention of fish, salmon, train oil and “Wildwahren”
as exports of the Murman coast. Similarly, in about 1575,
dried and salted cod, salmon, train oil, blubber and fish oil,
and furs were listed, and, in addition, mica. In the seventeenth
century, cod and salmon remained as major exports, but furs
had virtually disappeared, and train-oil and blubber seem to
have become of secondary importance. Mica can hardly be
imagined to have ever been a quantitatively important export
(Ahvenainen, 1967; Hart, 1976). A decline of train oil export
can be explained by the fact that the Dutch started whaling
and producing whale oil themselves from about 1615, hunt-
ing in the waters off the west coast of Spitsbergen (Hacquebord,
1984, 1988). Furs probably disappeared as a Murman coast
export about 1600, as a result of over-hunting of the animals
caused by the rise in the demand for furs generated by the
foreign merchants (Ahvenainen, 1967). The depletion of
furred animals deprived the Sami of an important source of
barter. To be able to continue their trade with the foreigners,
the Sami had increasingly to rely on the constant foreign
demand for fish. Thus, the Sami chose—or were forced by
circumstances—to lay more emphasis on fishing than before,
and, to some extent, to move from the interior to the coast
(Ahvenainen, 1967). The depletion of the furred animals, of
course, was a relative phenomenon. The animals by no means
became extinct. In 1653, the Danish party accompanying the
French traveler de la Martinière acquired skins of wolf, fox
and squirrel on the Varanger coast, and skins of lynx, fox and
ermine at Kola (Kosheckin, 1991).
The Dutch continued to visit Kola to buy cod. The cod
fishery was a seasonal activity, dependent on the arrival of the
fish. In spring and early summer, the number of inhabitants of
Kola exploded. Hundreds, even thousands of Pomors, Rus-
sian dwellers of the White Sea coasts, came to Kola and used
it as a base from which they shuttled in their small, open boats
to and from the fishing grounds. The permanent inhabitants
of the hamlet, too, mainly lived from the fisheries. They were
fishermen themselves and, in addition, they provided board
and lodging for the seasonal workers. They also supplied
them with equipment, such as fishing boats, which they built
themselves (Ushakov and Dashcinskij, 1983). Russian and
foreign merchants came over to buy cod during the summer.
The Russians came from the Northern Dvina, from Kargopol
up the river Onega, and from other towns. By this time, Kola
had a trade centre for Russian merchants, one for foreigners,
and a separate centre for the Dutch (Ushakov and Dashcinskij,
1983). The non-Dutch foreigners who came to Kola to buy
fish were probably predominantly Norwegians.
The purchase of salmon was the other main economic
activity of the Dutch on the Murman coast in the seventeenth
century. It was an intensive business. For about three months
every year, Dutchmen sailed along the Murman coast gather-
ing the precious fish, which were caught in the rivers by the
local population. For that purpose, they travelled in boats far
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transit trade with interior Russia, and then only by the Dutch.
To a large extent, the Murman coast commerce may be
identified with the trade with the coastal economy, while the
Northern Dvina commerce may be identified with the transit
trade with the Russian interior.
REFERENCES
AHVENAINEN, J. 1967. Some contributions to the question of
Dutch traders in Lapland and Russia at the end of the sixteenth
century. Acta Lapponica Fenniae 6:1 –53.
ATTMAN, A. 1973. The Russian and Polish markets in international
trade. Gothenburg: The Institute of Economic History,
Gothenburg University.
BEZEMER, J.W. 1988. Een geschiedenis van Rusland: Van Rurik
tot Brezjnev. Amsterdam: G.A. van Oorschot.
BRUIJN, J.R. 1977. De vaart in Europa. In: Akveld, L.M., Hart, S.,
and Hoboken, W.J. van, eds. Maritieme geschiedenis der
Nederlanden. Vol. 2. Bussum: De Boer Maritiem. 200–241.
———. 1979. Scheepvaart in de Noordelijke Nederlanden 1650–
1800. In: Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden. Vol. 8.
Haarlem: Fibula - Van Dishoeck. 209 –238.
BUCK, P. de. 1988. De Russische uitvoer uit Archangel naar
Amsterdam in het begin van de achttiende eeuw (1703 en 1709).
Economisch- en Sociaal-historisch Jaarboek 51:126 –193.
BUSCHING, A.F. 1790. Nieuwe en volledige geographie of
aardryksbeschryving. Vol. I. Part 2. Rusland, Pruissen, Polen,
Hongaryen en Europisch Turkyen, naar den vierden druk uit het
Hoogduits vertaald en met des schryvers afzonderlyk schriftlyk
medegedeelde vermeerderingen verrykt. Amsterdam: H.
Gartman, W. Vermandel en J.W. Smit.
BUSHKOVITCH, P. 1980. The merchants of Moscow, 1580–
1650. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
FLORJA, B.N. 1973. Torgovlja Rossii so stranami Zapadnoj Evropy
v Archangel’ske (konec XVI - nacalo XVII v.). Srednie Veka
36:129 – 151.
GROMYKO, M.M. 1960. Russko-niderlandskaja torgovlja na
Murmanskom beregu v XVI v. Srednie Veka 17:225 –255.
HACQUEBORD, L. 1984. Smeerenburg. Het verblijf van
Nederlandse walvisvaarders op de westkust van Spitsbergen in
de 17de eeuw. Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam.
———. 1988. West-Europese walvisvaart in de kustwateren van
Finnmarken (Noord-Noorwegen) in de 16de en 17de eeuw.
Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 7:4 –13.
HAKLUYT, R. 1967. Voyages. Vol. 1. With an introduction by J.
Masefield. Everyman’s Library 264. London: Dent.
HANSEN, L.I. 1984. Trade and markets in northern Fenno-
Scandinavia A.D. 1550–1750. Acta Borealia 1(2):47 – 79.
HART, S. 1969. De handelsbetrekkingen van Amsterdam met
Archangel en Lapland (Kola) in de 17e eeuw. Nederlands
Archievenblad 73:66– 80.
———. 1973. Amsterdam shipping and trade to Northern Russia in
the seventeenth century. Mededelingen van de Nederlandse
Vereniging voor Zeegeschiedenis 26:5 –30, 105 –116.
———. 1976. Amsterdamse scheepvaart en handel op Noord-
Rusland in de zeventiende eeuw. In: Hart, S. Geschrift en Getal.
up the rivers. The Dutch crews themselves usually cleaned,
salted and barreled the fish. Often, specially for the barreling,
coopers came along from the Netherlands. They were put
ashore at various places to make barrels and to fill them with
salmon. The Dutch called at, among other places, Kegor (on
Fisherman’s Peninsula), Kola, Kildin, Sem-Ostrovov (Seven
Islands), Iokanga and Ponoj; and they even sailed beyond the
Murman coast to Umba and Porja Guba on the south coast of
the Kola Peninsula in the Kandalakshskij Bay of the White
Sea (Ahvenainen, 1967; Hart, 1976; Hacquebord, 1988). The
Lapland salmon seems to have been “goed en lieflijk van geur
en roodachtig van kleur” (“of a good and lovely smell and of
a reddish colour”) (Hart, 1976:280).
Dutch vessels kept coming in small numbers to the Murman
coast “to fish,” as this trade was called, all through the
seventeenth century (Hart, 1976). Through archival research,
the Dutch historian P. de Buck has shown that the number of
Dutch ships sailing to the Murman coast usually amounted to
one to four in the period from 1590 to 1670, and to only one,
and in many years even none, in the period from 1670 to 1725.
Up to 1670, most of these ships had both the Murman coast
and Archangel as their destinations (P. de Buck, pers. comm.
1992). Some of them put into Kola or other harbours on the
Murman coast for a few days on their way to or from Arch-
angel. Others were freighted to sail to the Murman coast but
also had to call briefly at Archangel to land part of their cargo.
Moreover, the salmon loaded in Archangel often had been
brought in from Lapland (Ahvenainen, 1967; Hart, 1976).
CONCLUSION
The historiography of English and Dutch trade with the
Barents Sea area in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
tends to link the Murman coast trade and the Northern Dvina
trade, and to hardly discriminate between them. Closer obser-
vation, however, leads to the conclusion that the Murman
coast trade and the Northern Dvina trade largely coincided
with two clearly distinct branches of commerce—respec-
tively, the trade with the coastal economy of northern Russia,
and the transit trade with the Russian interior. The trade with
the coastal economy involved basically the exchange of
locally produced exports like cod, salmon, furs and train oil
for locally used imports like cloth, tinware, salt, pepper, and
wine. The transit trade with interior Russia involved the
exchange of the north and central Russian forestry and
agriculture products for gold and silver money and a wide
range of military stores and luxury goods. It is true that many
of the Dutch ships sailing the Murman coast also called at
Archangel in the course of a single journey. And it is true that
the trade with the coastal economy was conducted not only on
the Murman coast, but also on the Northern Dvina. But it is
equally true that the Murman coast trade was essentially
limited to the trade of the littoral, whereas the transit trade
with interior Russia was exclusively a Northern Dvina busi-
ness. Only from the early 1570s to about 1585 was Kola used
as an alternative to the Northern Dvina mouth as a port for the
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